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In the Wake of the « Polar Sea » : 
Canadian Jurisdiction and the Northwest Passage 
Ted L. MCDORMAN * 
A l'été de 1985, la traversée du Passage du nord-ouest par le brise-glace 
américain Polar Sea retint substantiellement l'attention du Gouvernement et 
des médias au Canada. Bien que les États-Unis n'aient pas eu alors pour but de 
mettre en question la juridiction du Canada sur les eaux du Passage du nord-
ouest, le Canada fut néanmoins obligé de réévaluer sa position quant au statut 
juridique des eaux internationales de même que la nature imprécise de ses 
prétentions sur certaines d'entre elles. 
L'article qui suit examine certaines questions, juridiques et extrajuridiques, 
soulevées par le voyage du Polar Sea. // s'intéresse spécialement à la position 
prise par le Gouvernement canadien à cette occasion. 
L'attachement à la liberté de naviguer fit prendre aux Américains une 
attitude qui rendit difficile la riposte canadienne. Les mesures que prit le 
Canada, à savoir le tracé de lignes de base droites et l'annonce de la 
construction d'un nouveau brise-glace, furent minutieusement pesées afin 
qu'elles n'amènent pas les États-Unis à contester directement les prétentions 
canadiennes tout en ayant pour effet de rendre plus crédible l'affirmation 
voulant que les eaux du Passage du nord-ouest soient des eaux intérieures 
canadiennes dans lesquelles un bateau étranger ne peut naviguer sans permission. 
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Introduction 
In late July and early August of 1985 attention in Canada was focussed 
on the voyage of the United States Coast Guard icebreaker Polar Sea 
through the Northwest Passage. The vessel left from Thule, Greenland, 
passed through Lancaster Sound, Barrow Strait, Viscount Melville Sound, 
and the narrow Prince of Wales Strait (not M'Clure Strait as indicated in 
many of the press reports) and continued across the Beaufort Sea to Point 
Barrow in Alaska. (See Figure One) The Polar Sea, normally stationed on 
the U.S. West Coast, had to resupply Thule following the breakdown of the 
vessel normally used for this task, and still undertake its summer research 
requirements and contracts in the U.S. Beaufort Sea. Use of the Northwest 
Passage saved 30 days and $500,000 that would have been expended in 
renavigating the Panama Canal. 
Several months prior to the navigation of the Passage, the proposed trip 
was made known to Canadian Coast Guard officials. The Canadian Coast 
Guard treated the voyage as a routine matter. It has been Canadian policy 
not to discourage use of the Northwest Passage, provided rigorous equipment 
and ship design standards are met. Because previous voyages of a U.S. 
vessel, the Manhattan in 1969 and 1970, had raised concerns of Canadian 
jurisdiction in the waters of the Arctic archipelago, the Canadian and 
American Governments exchanged diplomatic correspondence on the pro-
posed voyage of the Polar Sea. Both countries were aware of their difference 
of opinion regarding the legal status of the waters of the Northwest Passage 
and they agreed to disagree on this divergence. The position adopted was 
that the voyage of the Polar Sea would be "without prejudice" to Canadian 
claims over the waters and to the legal status of the waters and that the 
voyage would not be intended as a challenge to Canada's jurisdictional 
claims in the Northwest Passage. 
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Despite this understanding between the two countries, great public 
concern was expressed in Canada that the passage of the Polar Sea was a 
violation of Canada's jurisdiction in the Arctic. The focus of media attention 
was that the United States did not and would not request from the Canadian 
Government permission for the Polar Sea to transit the Northwest Passage. 
Dismay was expressed about the Canadian Government not "standing up" 
to the Americans and that this failure of Canadian resolve would undermine 
Canada's jurisdictional claims to the waters of the Canadian Arctic archi-
pelago. The United States was unwilling to ask permission since it was the 
U.S. view that that there was no legal requirement to seek permission and, 
although U.S.-Canada relations might have dictated a more flexible position 
by the United States, the Americans were concerned about the precedent 
that might be created by the United States asking for permission to enter 
legally-disputed waters. 
A month following the passage of the Polar Sea the Canadian Govern-
ment announced that it was going to undertake a series of actions designed 
to improve Canada's legal and diplomatic position that the waters of the 
Arctic archipelago were historic internal waters. The Government's action 
included : 
— the signing of a cabinet order establishing straight baselines around 
the Arctic archipelago to become effective on 1 January 1986 ' ; 
— announcing that a class 8 icebreaker would be constructed in Canada 
at a cost of $500,000,000 ; and 
— the withdrawing of Canada's 1970 reservation to the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice which had removed 
from the jurisdiction of the Court questions arising from Canada's 
claims to jurisdiction in the Arctic. 
The purpose of this note is to look at the legal and non-legal issues that 
have arisen in light of the voyage of the Polar Sea through the Northwest 
Passage, and the Canadian Government's action taken in the wake of the 
passage. However, a brief review of Canada's response to the passage of the 
Manhattan through the Northwest Passage in 1969 is first provided since it 
provides the required background to the 1985 Polar Sea controversy. 
1. The 1969 Passage of the Manhattan 
The voyage of the U.S.-flag vessel Manhattan, an oil tanker sent through 
the Northwest Passage in 1969 to test the feasibility of polar travel for such 
1. Territorial Sea Geographical Coordinates (Area 7) Order, P.C. Order 1985-2739, 10 Sep-
tember 1985, SOR/85-872. 
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vessels, forced Canada to attempt to clarify national views concerning 
jurisdictional claims over Arctic waters. The 1969 voyage had not been 
intended by the United States as a challenge to Canadian jurisdiction but the 
controversy aroused in Canada by the passage forced the Canadian Govern-
ment to re-evaluate its position regarding the waters of the Arctic2. The 
response was not to assert absolute jurisdiction over Arctic waters, but to 
approach the problem functionally with the primary goal of protecting the 
unique environment of the Arctic that might be harmed by regular passage 
of oil tankers or other vessels incapable of navigating in ice-infested waters3. 
This functional approach was embodied in the 1970 Arctic Waters Pollution 
Prevention Act4 which provided that Canada could legislate and enforce 
construction and design standards for vessels navigating in the pollution 
protection zone which was declared to exist to a width of 100-n. miles north 
of 60 degrees longitude around the Arctic archipelago. This legislation and 
its 100-n. mile zone was attacked by several countries, most notably the 
United States, as being in contravention of international law5. Much of the 
furor surrounding the Arctic Waters legislation arose because the extension 
of the 100-n. mile pollution zone came prior to the introduction of the 200-n. 
mile exclusive economic zone and many maritime states were apprehensive 
of the expansion of offshore jurisdiction by coastal states. A second concern 
of the protesting states was that the legislation allowed Canada unprece-
dented control over vessels navigating in the 100-n. mile pollution zone. The 
legislative requirements for ship design, construction, equipment and 
manning were perceived as a dangerous precedent that might be adopted by 
other states in protecting offshore areas. 
At the time of the enactment of the Arctic Waters legislation, Canada 
also deposited with the International Court of Justice a reservation to 
Canada's acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. Excluded 
from the Court's jurisdiction was 
2. Canada's pre-Manhattan policy regarding the Arctic is outlined in J.L. GRANASTSTEIN, « A 
Fit of Absence of Mind: Canada's National Interest in the North to 1968", in E.J. 
DOSMAN, ed., The Arctic in Question, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1976, p. 13-33. 
3. See: MCCONCHIE and REID, «Canadian Foreign Policy and International Straits», in 
B. JOHNSON and M.W. ZACHER, eds., Canadian Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea, 
Vancouver, Univ. of B.C. Press, 1977, p. 167-173. 
4. Revised Statutes of Canada (RSC) 1970, (1st Supp), c. 2, amended S.C. 1977-78, c. 41. 
5. The American protest and Canadian response are reprinted in International Legal 
Materials, Vol. 9, Washington, American Society of International Law, 1970, p. 605-615. 
See generally: A. GOTLIEB and C. DALFEN, «National Jurisdiction and International 
Responsibility: New Canadian Approaches to International Law», (1973) 67 American 
Journal of International Law 229-258; and R.M. M'GONIGLE, « Unilateralism and Interna-
tional Law : The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act », (1976) 34 University of Toronto 
Faculty of Law Review 180-198. 
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disputes arising out of or concerning jurisdiction or rights claimed or exercised 
by Canada in respect of the conservation, management or exploitation of the 
living resources of the sea, or in respect of the prevention or control of 
pollution or contamination of the marine environment in marine areas 
adjacent to the coast of Canada.6 
Canada also extended the width of its territorial waters from 3-n. miles 
to 12-n. miles. With the 12-n. mile territorial sea it is impossible to navigate 
through the Northwest Passage without passing through the territorial sea 
regime of Canada at certain "geographical choke-points", where the waters 
are less than 24-n. miles in width. With the 3-n. mile limit a vessel could have 
traversed the Northwest Passage, provided it used the difficult M'Clure 
Strait instead of the Prince of Wales Strait, without entering Canada's 
territorial waters. No demarcation of the outer limit of the territorial sea was 
ever done in the Arctic so the exact location of Canada's Northern territorial 
waters was uncertain. Throughout the 1970s, as the 12-n. mile territorial sea 
gained international acceptance, the United States steadfastly continued 
only to recognize the traditional 3-n. mile width. In 1983, as part of President 
Ronald Reagan's proclamation of a U.S. 200-n. mile exclusive economic 
zone, the 12-n. mile territorial sea of other states was also accepted7. 
During the 1970s, Canada expended considerable energy in having the 
international community recognize the legitimacy of the 1970 Arctic Waters 
legislation. The Canadian Government has claimed success in this quest with 
the inclusion in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea8 
of Article 234. 
Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and 
regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from 
vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, 
where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering 
such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to 
navigation, and pollution of the marine environment would cause major harm 
to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and 
regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment based on the best available scientific 
evidence. 
6. Text of the reservation is reproduced in International Legal Materials, Vol. 9, Washington. 
American Society of International Law, 1970, p. 598. See generally : R.St.J. MACDONALD, 
«The New Canadian Declaration of Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice», (1970) 8 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 3-38. 
7. Presidential Proclamation 5030, 48 Federal Register 10605 (lOMarch 1983) and reprinted in 
International Legal Materials, Vol. 22, Washington, American Society of International 
Law, 1983, p. 461-465. 
8. Done at Montego Bay, 10 December 1982; not yet in force; U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/122, 
7 October 1982 ; reprinted in International Legal Materials, Vol. 21, Washington, American 
Society of International Law, 1982, p. 1261 (hereinafter referred as the LOS Convention). 
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This Article permits coastal states bordering ice-covered waters to prescribe 
and enforce laws for the protection of the marine environment that are more 
stringent than internationally accepted standards. However, two important 
matters remain uncertain. First, whether Article 234 supports the Canadian 
Arctic Waters legislation despite the fact that the Article was included in the 
LOS Convention at the insistence of Canada9. Secondly, whether Article 234 
would permit Canada to apply the design and construction standards of the 
Arctic Waters legislation to the Northwest Passage if the waterway were an 
international straitl0. 
The international legal validity of Article 234 is in question since the 
1982 LOS Convention is not yet in force ". Canada has signed the Treaty but 
has not yet ratified it. The United States has declined to participate in the 
LOS Convention, although general statements exist that the United States 
accepts all parts of the LOS Convention except those dealing with deep 
seabed mining. The U.S. Government has not been explicit on this general 
policy. It has been posited that Article 234 is part of customary international 
law and therefore binding on all states 12. The United States has not 
specifically "faulted" Article 234 and some indications exist that the 
provision has or will be accepted by the United States as part of customary 
international law 13. The comments of the former Canadian Ambassador to 
the Law of the Sea Conference, Alan Beesley, made in 1983 are of interest : 
[...] I would hesitate, for example, to say that the Arctic exception, the ice-
covered waters provision, is already existing international law. However, I am 
relieved to hear others say it is, and I will take that into account.14 
The Polar Sea did, as far as Canada was concerned, comply with the 
Arctic Waters legislation 15 and consultation did exist between the Canadian 
9. D.M. MCRAE and D.J. GOUNDREY, « Environmental Jurisdiction in Arctic Waters; The 
Extent of Article 234« (1982) 16 University of British Columbia Law Review 197-228 and 
see: T.L. MCDORMAN, «National Legislation and Convention Obligations: Canadian 
Vessel-Source Pollution Law», (1983) 7 Marine Policy 302, p. 308. 
10. K.M. SHUSTERICK, «International Jurisdictional Issues in the Arctic Ocean», in W.E. 
WESTERMEYER and K.M. SHUSTERICK, eds., United Slates Arctic Interests: The 1980s and 
1990s. New York, Springer-Verlag, 1984, p. 255-256. 
11. The 1982 LOS Convention will come into force one year after the deposit of the sixtieth 
ratification. As of May 5, 1986, 29 states had deposited instruments of ratification. 
12. D. PHARAND, The Northwest Passage: Arctic Straits, Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 1984, 
p. 120. 
13. See: SHUSTERICK, supra, note 10, p. 254 and B. HOYLE, «The United States Government 
Perspective», in L. JUDA, ed., The United States Without the Law of the Sea Treaty: 
Opportunities and Costs, Wakefield, R.I.: Times Press, 1983, p. 135. 
14. J. BEESLEY, «Comment» in JUDA, .supra, note 13, p. 141. 
15. U.S.C.G.C. «Polar Sea» Exemption Order, P.C. Order 1985-2409, 1 August 1985, 
SOR/85-722. 
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and American Coast Guards concerning the legislative requirements, 
although it is uncertain whether the United States explicitly recognized the 
legislation. One report stated : 
Lawyers went through appropriate laws with fine-tooth combs and the 
Canadians took meticulous care over detail, down to the state of every piece of 
environmental equipment on the vessel.16 
The legal status of the waters of the Northwest Passage was not resolved 
by the voyage of the Manhattan and many of the same issues that arose in 
1969-70 surrounded the trip of the Polar Sea. The passage of the Manhattan 
did sensitize Canadians to problems of Canadian jurisdiction in the waters of 
the Arctic archipelago. The Canadian functional response was the result of 
the realization that a more "heroic" assertion of jurisdiction would be met 
by stiff American protests and possible direct confrontation. 
2. Conflicting Views of the Legal Status of the Northwest Passage 
International ocean relations during the last decades have been a 
process of reconciling the conflicting interests of maritime states, which have 
sought to protect their traditional rights of navigational freedoms or 
freedom of the seas, and coastal states, which have sought to exercise 
jurisdiction over ever-expanding offshore areas. Multilateral treaties such as 
the four 1958 Geneva Conventions on the law of the sea and the recently-
completed 1982 LOS Convention are the written evidence of the compromises 
which have taken the form of different jurisdictional regimes applying in 
different ocean areas. A recent study determined that 58 different jurisdic-
tional regimes are identified in the 1982 LOS Convention 17. 
The jurisdictional regimes that are relevant to the Northwest Passage 
are: 
(i) historic internal waters ; 
(ii) internal waters enclosed by straight baselines drawn in accordance 
with the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Caseli, a decision of the 
International Court of Justice ; 
(iii) internal waters enclosed by straight baselines where the waters 
enclosed were previously high seas or part of the territorial sea ; 
(iv) the territorial sea ; and 
(v) international straits. 
16. «Northwest Passage not for the Soviets, U.S. envoy feels», Toronto Globe and Mail, 2 
August 1985. 
17. P. ALLOTT, «Power Sharing in the Law of the Sea», (1983) 77 American Journal of 
International Law, 1, p. 28-29. 
18. [1951] International Court of Justice Reports 116. 
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If the waters of the Northwest Passage fall within one of the first two 
categories, the coastal state has absolute jurisdiction over all vessels navigat-
ing in those waters and vessels wishing to navigate in those waters could be 
required to seek permission for such navigation. If the waters of the 
Northwest Passage are either part of the territorial sea or enclosed by 
straight baselines not drawn pursuant to the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, 
then there exists a right of innocent passage for foreign-flag vessels. 
The distinction between the second and third category is based upon the 
interaction between the 1951 Court decision and the more recent multilateral 
treaties. The International Court of Justice in 1951 accepted that Norway 
could draw straight baselines enclosing islands along its coast because of 
economic, sociological, geographic and historic factors that made the waters 
around the islands sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject 
to the regime of internal waters. By drawing straight baselines Norway was 
able to use the outermost points of the coastal fringe of islands and connect 
these points with straight lines. More recent state practice regarding straight 
baselines has been to follow the Norwegian example of using prominent 
mainland points, or adjacent offshore islands, and connect these points using 
straight lines. The normal method of drawing coastal baselines is to follow 
the contours of the land using the low-water mark. The use of straight 
baselines, therefore, allows for a certain evenness in the baselines and allows 
a state to enclose greater areas of water landward of the baseline. Inherent in 
the Court's decision was that the waters landward of the straight baselines 
would not allow for a right of foreign vessel navigation ". The 1982 LOS 
Convention (Article 7) and the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and the Contiguous Zone (Article 4) adopted the decision of the 
International Court regarding the criteria to be applied when drawing 
straight baselines. The two multilateral treaties, however, in Articles 8 and 5 
respectively, state that in waters enclosed by straight baselines which were 
not previously considered as internal waters the right of foreign vessel 
innocent passage will apply. The prevailing view is that these provisions of 
the two multilateral treaties relating to the criteria for the drawing of 
baselines are part of customary law20. 
19. Ibid, p. 132; see: M.S. McDouGALand W.T. BURKE, The Public Order of the Oceans, New 
Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1962, p. 120-122 and T. GIHL, «The Baseline of the Territorial 
Sea ..(1967) II Scandinavian Studies in Law 145, p. 152, 171-173. 
20. L. M. ALEXANDER, « Baseline Delimitations and Maritime Boundaries », (1983) 23 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 503-519. A more recent survey of state practice is found in 
Victor PRESCOTT, «Straight Baselines: Theory and Practice», a paper presented 19th 
Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, held in Cardiff, Wales, 24-27 July 1985. 
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There is uncertainty regarding the status of Articles 8 and 5. Article 5 of 
the 1958 Treaty has been described as "an innovation in international law"2I, 
although the wording has been repeated in Article 8 of the LOS Convention. 
When Article 5 was first proposed it was intended to have a narrow scope, 
as is clear from the following commentary of the International Law 
Commission. 
The question arose whether in waters which become internal waters when the 
straight baseline system is applied the right of passage should not be granted in 
the same way as in the territorial sea. Stated in such general terms, this 
argument was not approved by the majority of the Commission. The Commis-
sion was, however, prepared to recognize that if a State wished to make a fresh 
delimitation of its territorial sea according to the straight baseline principle, 
thus including in its internal waters parts of the high seas or of the territorial 
sea that had previously been waters through which international traffic passed, 
other nations could not be deprived of the right of passage in those waters.22 
State practice does not provide any clear answers regarding the legal status 
of Articles 5 and 8. 
The right of innocent passage is a careful balance between the security 
and economic interests of the coastal state and the navigational rights of 
vessels involved in passage. Vessels exercising innocent passage rights while 
having to comply with certain coastal state legislative requirements are 
entitled to navigate the waters without requesting the permission of the 
coastal state. The coastal state, however, can temporarily suspend the right 
of innocent passage for security reasons. Canada has long been troubled by 
the balance of interests in innocent passage, particularly regarding the ability 
of the coastal state to protect itself from threats of marine environmental 
pollution from vessels exercising their right of innocent passage23. 
If the waters are an international strait, the ability of the coastal state to 
control the passage of foreign vessels is even more restricted. Article 16(4) of 
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 
states that in an international strait non-suspendable innocent passage exists. 
The 1982 LOS Convention goes further in protecting the rights of user states 
by creating "transit passage" which is less rigorous from the navigating 
states' perspective than innocent passage. In this regard it is interesting that 
despite its non-participation in the 1982 LOS Convention, the United States 
has been quick to argue that the provisions of the Treaty dealing with straits 
21. GiHL, supra, note 19, p. 171. 
22. United Nations, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II, 1956, p. 268. 
23. See : MCDORMAN, supra, note 9, p. 306-307. 
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and transit passage are part of customary international law and binding on 
all states24. 
As has been noted, some opinion exists that even if the Northwest 
Passage is an international strait transiting vessels would have to comply 
with Canada's rigorous Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. Regarding 
warships and Government ships operated for non-commercial purposes, 
which is the classification into which the Polar Sea falls, coastal state control 
is virtually non-existent, even the Arctic Waters legislation does not apply to 
these vessels. 
2.1. The Canadian Position 
At the time of the Polar Sea's trip through the Northwest Passage, 
ministerial comments and External Affairs memoranda arising from the 
passage of the Manhattan were all that existed as a record of Canada's claim 
to the waters of the Arctic. The position taken was that the waters of the 
entire Arctic archipelago were historic internal waters, but Canada's historic 
waters claim was never well-articulated, particularly respecting the implica-
tions such a claim would have on navigation. A 1980 Canadian Government 
memorandum stated : 
Canada continues to maintain the position that the Northwest Passage is not 
an international strait ; that the waters making up the passage are internal ; and 
that any navigation in the Passage will be subject to Canadian control and 
regulation for safety and environmental purposes.25 
This statement is not inconsistent with the existence of a right of navigational 
innocent passage for foreign vessels. As has been noted, following the voyage 
of the Manhattan Canada responded by detailing a functional claim over the 
waters designed to protect the environment and not a claim designed to 
assert comprehensive jurisdiction. The United States reacted strongly to the 
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, presenting to the Canadian 
Government a detailed protest of the legislation. In the early 1960s Canada 
had contemplated enclosing the waters of the Arctic by straight baselines, 
but this drew criticism from both the United States and the United 
24. See: B. A. HARLOW, « Comment », (1983)46 Law and Contemporary Problems 125-135and 
also « Discussion », in J. VAN DYKR, ed., Consensus and Confrontation : The United States 
and the Law of the Sea Convention, Honolulu, Law of the Sea Institute, 1985, p. 292-303. 
25. Canadian Department of External Affairs Legal Bureau memorandum of 17 September 
1980, (1980) 19 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 322. 
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Kingdom26. Against this background it is understandable why Canada has 
proceeded in a non-confrontationalist way in declaring and exercising 
jurisdiction. 
Dr. Donat Pharand, the leading world legal authority on the Canadian 
Arctic, has examined the several options that might be available to support 
Canada's jurisdictional claims over Arctic waters. Concerning a claim of 
historic internal waters the onus is upon the claimant state to show that the 
necessary elements exist for a claim of historic waters : an exclusive exercise 
of state authority ; long usage or passage of time ; and acquiescence by other 
states. The major problem for Canada is that the official statements have 
been inconsistent regarding Canada's claim and a detailed articulation of its 
position has never been made. After carefully evaluating Canada's potential 
claim that the Northwest Passage and other Arctic waters are historic 
internal waters, he concluded that "it appears that Canada would not 
succeed in establishing an historic claim that the waters of the Arctic 
archipelago are internal waters"27. 
Dr. Pharand suggests that Canada's claim to the waters as internal 
might be supportable if reliance were placed on the 1951 International Court 
of Justice decision. Canada would have to argue its internal waters position 
on the basis of the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case being customary 
international law not superseded by the two multilateral treaties. Canada is 
not a party to either treaty. It is Dr. Pharand's view that if Canada's Arctic 
could be equated with the islands along the Norwegian coast that straight 
baselines drawn on the basis of the wording of the Court's 1951 decision 
would be supportable28. 
Canada, however, had never asserted its internal waters claim on the 
basis of straight baselines and while having contemplated the proclaiming of 
such lines had at the time of the Polar Sea's voyage not done so. It is 
interesting to note that a continental shelf boundary line was agreed upon 
between Canada and Greenland in 1973, largely based upon equidistance 
26. MCCONCHIE and REID, supra, note 3, p. 166 and A.E. GOTLIEB, «Canadian Diplomatic 
Initiatives : The Law of the Sea » in M.G. FRY, ed., Freedom and Change : Essays in Honour 
of Lester B. Pearson, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1975, p. 145-147. 
27. D. PHARAND, «The legal regime of the Arctic: Some outstanding issues», (1984) 34 
International Journal 742, p. 748-769. 
28. Ibid., p. 769-784. American commentators have taken a different view, see : C. REINHARD, 
«International Law: Implications of the Opening of the Northwest Passage», (1970) 74 
Dickinson Law Review 678-690. 
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between agreed upon baselines, but Canada did not make the baseline 
determination public M. 
A Canadian claim to the waters of the Arctic as historic internal waters 
or internal waters because of straight baselines would be assisted if reliance 
could be placed upon Inuit use of the waters and surrounding land since it 
would indicate a presence over an extended period of time. Should Canada 
vigorously voice its international position based on Inuit historic use it could 
create significant problems for the Government in its negotiations with the 
Inuit over outstanding land claims. This is one of the reasons for a reticence 
to detail an historic claim or one where historic use is a substantial 
component30. 
That Canada had not vigorously asserted its claim that the waters of the 
Arctic archipelago were internal waters that would not allow for innocent 
passage is evidenced by the 1980 Department of External Affairs memo-
randum noted above. Domestic ramifications of such a claim and almost 
assured resistance on the part of the United States had forced Canada to 
appear less than certain of its position. An international legal tribunal being 
seized with this issue at the time of the passage of the Polar Sea would have 
undoubtedly found Canada's claim to the waters of the Arctic as historic 
internal water as indifferently pursued and inconsistently expressed, which 
would have been severely damaging to Canada's position. 
The voyage of the Polar Sea through the Passage will not have hurt 
Canada's claim in any material way at least regarding how an international 
legal tribunal would view the issue. The Governments agreed that the voyage 
was "without prejudice" to the legal position of either country, notification 
and consultation took place, and in the end Canadian observers were placed 
on the vessel and "permission" was granted, despite never having been 
requested. All of these, particularly the "without prejudice" understanding, 
would ensure that the trip of the Polar Sea would be unusable as a precedent 
against Canada's claim. 
Concurrently, Canada's immediate reaction to the voyage of the Polar 
Sea would not be of great support to its jurisdictional claims over the 
Northwest Passage. Many of the critics of the Canadian Government's 
29. Canada, Treaty Series, 1974 n° 9. Signed 17 December 1973; came into force 13 March 
1974. 
30. The issue of Inuit land claims, international jurisdiction and historic use is an extremely 
complicated one. See: David VANDERZWAAG and D. PHARAND, ..Inuit and the Ice: 
Implications for Canadian Arctic Waters», (1983) 21 Canadian Yearbook of International 
Law 53-84 and P. JULL and N. BANKES, « Inuit Interests in the Arctic Offshore» in Ocean 
Policy and Management in the Arctic, Ottawa, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, 1984, 
p. 85-114. 
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posture regarding the Polar Sea felt that it was an opportune time to 
strengthen Canada's legal position, for example, by officially protesting the 
voyage. Such a diplomatic protest would have put Canada's position most 
forcefully. However, it would have been very difficult for Canada to issue a 
protest following the reaching of "an agreement to disagree", the consultation 
between the Coast Guards of the two countries, and with the realization that 
Canada had neither the capacity nor the intention of attempting to stop the 
Polar Sea from navigating the Passage. 
2.2. The American Position 
On issues involving navigational rights the United States has persistently 
taken a strong stand to protect the right of navigational passage. In August 
1981, U.S. aircraft and Libyan aircraft were involved in a brief skirmish in 
the Gulf of Sidra that Libya had declared in 1973 to be an historic bay and 
hence internal waters in which the U.S. vessels were not permitted31. While 
the trend in this century has been for coastal states to extend their 
jurisdiction ever seaward, the United States, along with other maritime 
powers, have sought to ensure a continued right of unimpeded navigation 
over as wide an area as possible. One must not underestimate the resolve of 
the United States regarding navigational issues and in particular regarding 
passage rights in international straits32. The U.S. position on the Northwest 
Passage has been consistent since prior to the voyage of the Manhattan — the 
Passage is an international strait. 
An international strait is more properly referred to as a "strait used for 
international navigation". International treaty law has never formulated a 
meaning for a "strait used for international navigation". The source of law 
for the meaning to be given a "strait used for international navigation" is the 
1949 International Court of Justice decision between the United Kingdom 
and Albania, the Corfu Channel Casen. Since the 1949 decision debate has 
raged whether an international strait can exist where it is "capable" of being 
used as a strait for international navigation (geographical approach) or, if it 
is necessary that the passage "has been used" as a strait for international 
navigation, and if the latter then how frequently must it have been used to 
31. See: J. M. SPINNATO, « Historic and Vital Bays : An Analysis of Libya's Claim to the Gulf 
of Sidra», (1983) 13 Ocean Development and International Law Journal 65, p. 65-68. 
32. See: A. HOLLICK, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea, Princeton, N.J. P.U.P., 1981, 
p. 234-237, 271-273 and E.L. RICHARDSON, «Law of the Sea: Navigation and Other 
Traditional National Security Considerations», (1982) 19 San Diego Law Review 553-576. 
33. [1949] International Court ofJustic Reports 4. 
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elevate the waterway to an international strait (functional approach). In 
looking at these issues as they affect the Northwest Passage, Dr. Pharand has 
recently written that there is a necessity for a waterway to have been used 
and "that the actual use has to be considerable", hence he concludes that the 
Northwest Passage is not currently a "strait used for international navi-
gation". Dr. Pharand leaves open the possibility that should traversing the 
Northwest Passage become a common occurrence the waterway could 
become an international strait34. 
The amount of known traffic through the Northwest Passage has been 
insignificant, although promises of mineral wealth in the Arctic has led 
observers to speculate on the possibilities of increased traffic. An inter-
national legal tribunal viewing the current evidence would probably find that 
the Northwest Passage was in fact not a "strait used for international 
navigation". 
In making the case that the Northwest Passage was an international 
strait, the United States could resort to the Polar Sea's navigation as a piece 
of evidence. It would not be seen as a strong piece of evidence, since the 
United States did indicate that the voyage was "without prejudice" to the 
legal status of the waters. Moreover, there was notification and consultation 
regarding the passage and it is the United States' position regarding an 
international strait that no notification of impending travel is necessary. 
2.3. The Middle Ground 
If an international tribunal were looking at the legal cases of Canada 
and the United States at the time the Polar Sea traversed the Northwest 
Passage, the tribunal would reject the Canadian position that the Passage 
was internal waters which gave Canada jurisdiction to restrict vessel 
navigation. The tribunal would similarly reject the position of the United 
States that the passage was an international strait. The tribunal would be left 
with the option that the Northwest Passage was part of Canada's territorial 
sea in which foreign vessels would have the undisputed right of innocent 
passage. 
3. The United States and the Voyage of the Polar Sea 
U.S. policy on the Northwest Passage is the outcome of four considera-
tions. The first is a domestic concern that there may exist an economic 
benefit to be derived from free access to the Passage. This commercial 
34. PHARAND, supra, note 12, p. 88-121. 
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benefit would only be realized in the event of significant hard mineral or 
hydrocarbon development in the Arctic where Passage navigation would 
reduce transportation costs. The second consideration has already been 
noted, the United States' intense commitment to freedom of navigation. The 
United States has consistently fought against the creeping offshore juris-
dictional expansionism of coastal states to the point that it is almost a reflex 
position. It is only to be expected that the United States would, at a 
minimum, reserve its position regarding the legal status of the waters, 
particularly so where on previous occasions, in particular at the time of the 
Manhattan voyage, the United States made its position very clear that it 
viewed the Northwest Passage as an international strait. 
Linked to the second consideration is the concern that restriction of 
navigational rights in the Passage might be used by other states as a 
precedent against the U.S. policy of unimpeded vessel mobility. U.S. 
Ambassador to Canada, Thomas Niles, responding to the Canadian initia-
tives taken following the passage of the Polar Sea was explicit that one of the 
serious concerns that the United States had with Canadian action regarding 
the Arctic waters was that it might have a precedent value for other states 
arguing in favour of increased jurisdiction over waters and passing vessels35. 
Given the uniqueness of the Arctic environment, and the closeness of the 
Canada-United States relationship, it is questionable whether there is much 
danger of restriction of passage in the Northwest Passage being of much 
value as a precedent for other states. 
The fourth consideration is the ideological posture of the current U.S. 
administration in general, and on ocean matters in particular. This ideological 
consideration underlies the first two considerations mentioned. The United 
States seeks to promote freedom from international and foreign control over 
its actions. The unwillingness of the United States, for example, to participate, 
even as an observer, at the Preparatory Commission, was principally an 
ideological decision based on objections to the Third World's hopes for a 
new international economic order and the international seabed regime36. 
This view that U.S. actions should be "unrestrained" would carry over to a 
posture on an issue like the legal status of the Northwest Passage. 
35. «Super-breaker and hard lines to assert Arctic sovereignty», Victoria Times-Colonist, 
11 September 1985. 
36. See: L. S. RATINER, «The Law of the Sea: A Crossroads for American Foreign Policy» 
(1982) Foreign Affairs 1006; BURKE and BROKAW, « Idelology and the Law of the Sea » in 
B.H. OXMAN, D.D. CARON,andC.L.O. BuREDi,eds.,Law of the Sea: U.S. Policy Dilemma, 
San Francisco, Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1983, p. 57 and « Law of the Sea 
Convention», excerpts from a White House Office of Policy Information paper, dated 
15 April 1983, reprinted in (1983) 26 Oceanus 74-76. 
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It is difficult to give much credence to any suggestion that the United 
States would be motivated by military considerations to seek to define the 
Northwest Passage as an international strait. Through NATO and NORAD 
the United States would be able to accomplish any military maneuvering it 
thought necessary to make in the Canadian Arctic. International legal 
navigational rights would add little to U.S. military designs for the Arctic. 
A necessary consequence of the U.S. position that the Northwest 
Passage is an international strait would be that the Arctic waterway could be 
used by any state, including the Soviet Union. There have long been 
unconfirmed sightings and rumours of Soviet submarine activity in the 
Northwest Passage, as well as British and U.S. submarine activity37. 
External Affairs Minister Clark, in making his statement regarding the 
action to be taken by Canada in the Arctic38, referred to the Soviet 
deployment of submarines under the Arctic ice pack (although not specifically 
in the Northwest Passage) as a factor in the decisions taken by Canada. This 
statement is believed to be the first official Canadian Government statement 
of fact regarding Soviet submarine activities but no further elaboration was 
given by the Minister39. A Canadian Rear-Admiral commented the next day 
that part of Canada's initiatives in the Arctic should include the establishment 
of a submarine detection system at the key entrance points to the Arctic 
archipelago40. The possibility of overt Soviet use of the Northwest Passage 
has a disquieting effect on U.S. spokesmen. Former U.S. Ambassador to 
Canada Paul Robinson felt that although the Northwest Passage was an 
international strait, if the Soviet Union used the waterway the United States 
would be upset41. The Soviet Union, however, supports Canada's claim42 
and have shown no interest in overtly navigating the Northwest Passage. 
Ironically, if this were not the case, the United States might be more disposed 
to ensuring that innocent passage rights did not exist in the Passage. 
37. « Unknown in Arctic worries Ottawa », Toronto Globe and Mail, 29 July 1985 and « Soviet 
sub rumours surface in wake of Polar Sea trip », Toronto Globe and Mail, 12 August 1985. 
See also : W. K. LYON, «The Navigation of Arctic Polar Submarines» (1984) il Journal of 
Navigation 155-179. 
38. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 10 September 1985, p. 6463. 
39. « Ottawa acts to strengthen Arctic claims », Toronto Globe and Mail, 11 September 1985. 
40. «Sub detection next step for North, experts say», Toronto Globe and Mail, 12 September 
1985. 
41. « Northwest Passage not for Soviets, U.S. envoy feels », Toronto Globe and Mail, 2 August 
1985. 
42. «Soviets support Canada's claim to Arctic passage», Victoria Times Colonist, 7 August 
1985 and « U.S. remains silent over testing claim on Soviet passage», Toronto Globe and 
Mail, 8 August 1985. 
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While the United States is unlikely to officially retract its position on the 
Northwest Passage, it seems equally unlikely that the United States will 
deliberately challenge Canada's position by sending a vessel through the 
waterway expressly for that purpose. It has been suggested, however, that 
the voyage of the Polar Sea "is obviously the opening move in a large 
campaign" by the United States to challenge Canada's Arctic claims43. This 
is difficult to believe since the Polar Sea was expressly not intended to raise a 
problem over jurisdictional problems. The Polar Sea adventure inadvertently 
brought to the fore an issue that had remained conveniently out of the way 
for fifteen years and the United States "would have preferred if the dispute 
had never arisen"44. Moreover, at the U.S. State Department there was 
"surprise and disappointment" at the controversy that erupted45. 
4. Canada in the Wake of the Polar Sea 
4.1. The Bilateral Dimension 
Canada's problems regarding the legal status of the Northwest Passage 
lies solely with the United States. Few other countries are much concerned 
with Canada's Arctic claims. The Soviet Union, a state that might otherwise 
be interested, favours Canada's posture that the waters of the Arctic 
archipelago are internal waters in which there is no right of foreign 
navigation. The Soviet Union adopted an approach to its northern waters 
similar to that found in Canada's 1970 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention 
Act46. Prior to 1983 the Soviet Union had not made clear its views respecting 
the legal status of the northern waters with different writers and pronounce-
ments claiming internal seas and historic waters for northern areas47. 
Enabling legislation for straight baselines was enacted by the Soviet Union in 
198348 and a Council of Minister's Decree of 7 February 1984 established 
baselines in the Soviet Union, including the northern waters. 
43. Professor Gerald MORRIS as quoted in «A questionable claim», Maclean's Magazine, 
19 August 1985, p. 21. 
44. « U.S. voices regret over Canada's new Arctic claim », Vancouver Sun, 12 September 1985. 
45. «Northwest Passage not for the Soviets, U.S. envoy feels», Toronto Globe and Mail, 2 
August 1985. 
46. See : W. J. DEHNER, « Creeping Jurisdiction in the Arctic : Has the Soviet Union Joined 
Canada?» (1972) 13 Harvard International Law Journal 271-288 and W. E. BUTLER, 
Northeast Arctic Passage, Alpen aan den Rijn, Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1978, p. 119-120. 
47. BUTLER, supra, note 46, p. 79-90. 
48. Law of the State Boundary of the U.S.S.R., reprinted in International Legal Materials, Vol. 
22, Washington, American Society of International Law, 1983, p. 1055-1076. 
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On many issues it is customary for Canada to seek international support 
and recognition for its position as a means of finessing American objections. 
The existence of Article 234 is evidence of the success of that policy. At the 
moment, however, recourse to the international community to solve the 
problem of the legal status of the Northwest Passage would not seem to be 
available, since there are not appropriate international fora to deal with such 
a technical legal issue. 
Since the issue is a bilateral one, it would appear reasonable to reach a 
bilateral accord with the United States whereby the United States would 
recognise Canada's legal position and Canada would concede certain 
navigational privileges. External Affairs Minister Clark indicated such 
bilateral discussions would be held and the United States indicated a 
willingness to conduct discussions. However, because of the sensitivity of 
navigational rights to the United States and the fear that such a public 
agreement could be used by other states which have conflicts with the United 
States regarding legal status of waters, it is extremely unlikely that any 
bilateral agreement will result from proposed discussions4'. The United 
States has taken a strong position against bilateral treaties regarding 
navigational issues. 
Canada has had to view carefully whether to move directly to deal with 
the issues raised by the voyage of the Polar Sea or proceed more discreetly 
and indirectly, with the same goal in mind, that of securing increased 
Canadian jurisdiction over vessel navigation in the Arctic. Referring to the 
efficiency of direct state actions regarding jurisdictional issues one authority 
commented : 
Claimant States are usually sufficiently astute to avoid direct confrontation 
with protesting States in making their claims effective, and will rely on probing 
to ascertain how far they can go in practice without exacerbating the 
diplomatic situation beyond what is necessary and proportionate in the 
circumstances. By a series of successful steps, the claim can be consolidated in 
fact, and the protests directed towards it can be undermined by a series of 
retreats on the part of protesting States.50 
Canadian policy on the navigation of foreign vessels in waters claimed by 
Canada has been to exercise control over the vessels, not to take actions to 
deny access. 
49. See: B. HOYLE, «National Legislation», in JUDA, supra, note 13, p. 254 and B. BRITTEN, 
<• Bilateral Agreements», in JUDA 239-243. 
50. D.P. O'CONNELL, The International Law of the Sea, Vol. I, London, Clarendon Press, 1982, 
p. 42. 
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The Canadian Government's announced actions respecting the waters 
of the Arctic are a careful blend of direct and indirect action designed to 
maximize Canada's legal position without provoking the United States into 
a response that Canada would be unable to control and that would put the 
Canadian Government in a politically embarrassing position. 
4.2. The International Legal Dimension 
The most direct action Canada could have taken respecting the 
Northwest Passage would have been to get an agreement, if that were 
possible, with the United States to submit the issue to an international 
tribunal, such as the International Court of Justice. As has been indicated 
above, the legal issues are not so clear as to predetermine the outcome. 
Canada's claim to the waters as internal has never been well articulated. A 
clear pronouncement by an arbitration panel that the waters were an 
international strait or at least allowed uninterrupted foreign vessel passage 
(innocent passage) would be a loss for Canada and be an unacceptable 
alternative for the United States. Threatening to go to the International 
Court makes good headlines51, and may provoke the United States to 
consider the implications of its stance, but it has potential grave losses and 
uncertainties. 
Rather than challenging the United States directly to a court battle, 
Canada took the indirect action of removing its reservation withdrawing 
Arctic jurisdictional issues from the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court. This gets the point across to the United States that Canada is 
willing to go to Court to argue its position. Canada's action of removing its 
reservation will give added weight to Canada's position on the legal status of 
the waters of the Arctic. 
Canada's stance regarding jurisdiction over the waters of the Arctic 
archipelago has suffered from inconsistency and lack of clarity. For offshore 
jurisdictional claims to reach the stage of being beyond challenge they must 
be vigorously pursued by the coastal state and gain the acceptance of the 
world community. To be credible they must be well-articulated and action 
taken by the claimant state must be consistent with its claim. 
The most vigorous action Canada could have taken regarding Arctic 
jurisdiction would have been to emphatically state and detail Canada's claim 
that the waters of the Arctic archipelago are internal waters in which no 
51. «Clark might take sovereignty issue to International Court», Ottawa Citizen, 3 August 
1985. 
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navigational rights for foreign vessels exist. The United States would most 
certainly have issued a diplomatic protest over Canada's assertion and might 
have been provoked into taking action that Canada would have been unable 
to control and hence would have put Canada in a very embarrassing 
position. Should the United States not have taken any overt action and 
merely protested, as happened regarding the Arctic Waters legislation, the 
stalemate of "agreeing to disagree" would have continued although Canada's 
legal position would have been improved. This direct action might have 
worked in Canada's interest but it might have also spelled political downfall 
for the Government should the United States have chosen to physically 
challenge Canada's assertion. 
4.3. Balancing the Interests 
What Canada has done is put in place a system of straight baselines but 
without articulating a "detailed" explanation of Canada's historic waters 
claim or without stating what the precise ramifications of the baselines are 
upon navigation. 
External Affairs Minister Clark in his statement to the House of 
Commons on Canadian Arctic jurisdiction52 indicated that the baselines 
were to "define the outer limit of Canada's historic internal waters" and 
commented that from "time immemorial Canada's Inuit people have used 
and occupied the ice as they have used and occupied the land". The minister 
made it clear that Canada was going to exercise "full sovereignty in and on 
the waters of the Arctic archipelago". Concerning navigation, however, he 
stated : 
The policy of the Government is also to encourage the development of the 
navigation in Canadian Arctic waters. Our goal is to make the Northwest 
Passage a reality for Canadians and foreign shipping as a Canadian waterway. 
Navigation, however, will be subject to the controls and other measures 
required for Canada's security, for the preservation of the environment, and 
for the welfare of the Inuit and other inhabitants of the Canadian Arctic. 
The controls and measures outlined by the Minister to be exercised are not 
inconsistent with the right of innocent passage. 
Since it remains uncertain whether vessels have the right of innocent 
passage in the waters landward of these straight baselines, the United States 
may feel content with a mere protest of the excessive length of the baselines 
and a reservation of its position regarding the legal status of the waters 
enclosed by the straight baselines. The immediate response to the Canadian 
52. Supra, note 38, p. 6462-6464. 
T. L. MCDORMAN The Northwest Passage 643 
actions on Arctic waters jurisdiction has been to express "regret" and to 
indicate that consultation between the states is necessary53. This expression 
of "regret" is a mild American response and, although it is predictable that 
following a detailed analysis of the announced straight baselines a diplomatic 
protest will be forthcoming, it is unlikely that a more vigorous U.S. reaction 
will be made. 
The establishment of straight baselines around the Arctic archipelago is 
a crucial step in the enhancement of Canada's legal claim that the status of 
the waters of the Arctic are internal waters within which foreign vessels are 
not permitted without permission. However, it is necessary for Canada to 
continue to take action to consolidate its position that the waters of the 
Arctic are internal in order to make its claim more "credible" and "legally 
opposable" against the conflicting claim of the United States. 
Much of the adverse publicity surrounding the voyage of the Polar Sea 
centered on Canada's lack of icebreaking capacity. The most embarrassing 
aspect of the Polar Sea incident for Canada was not the perceived violation 
of sovereignty but the lack of Arctic class icebreakers that would establish a 
year round Canadian presence in Arctic waters. The United States and 
Soviet Union both have icebreaking capabilities far in excess of Canada. It 
has been suggested, tongue-in-cheek, that Canada should charter an Eastern 
Bloc icebreaker for duty in the Canadian Arctic. By announcing that the 
Canadian Government will build one of the largest icebreakers in the world, 
the Government has deflected much of the criticism levelled at it during the 
Polar Sea incident. 
The building of the Class 8 Polar icebreaker, capable of breaking 
through ice eight feet thick54, will provide Canada with year-round Arctic 
capabilities (except in the M'Clure Strait where a Class 10 icebreaker would 
be needed) and will give Canada an ability to enforce its jurisdiction in the 
Arctic. The element of enforcement or ability to enforce is significant in 
jurisdictional claims since where claims are enforced or can be enforced they 
tend to be recognized and are more quickly consolidated as part of 
international law55. The only Canadian appointed to the International 
Court, Judge John E. Read in the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case 
commented "the only convincing evidence of state practice is to be found in 
53. « U.S. voices regret over Canada's new Arctic claim », Vancouver Sun, 12 September 1985. 
54. A Polar 8 icebreaker is described in « Polar 8 icebreaker designed to guard Arctic 
sovereignty », Toronto Globe and Mail, 12 September 1985. See generally : J. D. HARBRON, 
«Modern Icebreakers», Scientific America, September 1983, p. 49-55. 
55. O'Connell, supra, note 50, p. 36. 
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seizures, where the coastal state asserts its sovereignty over the waters in 
question" 56. 
In Arctic waters Canada currently has in place a voluntary vessel traffic 
system (NORDREG) intended to provide information and assistance to 
Arctic ship operators. The 1984 Beaufort Sea Environmental Assessment 
and Review Panel report recommended that to enhance marine environ-
mental protection NORDREG should become mandatory. The Review 
Panel also recommended the establishment of other institutional mechanisms 
to increase the degree of control Canada exercises over vessels in the Arctic. 
The NORDREG system is a vessel traffic reporting system (VTRS) which 
would require vessels to request clearance to proceed in advance of entering 
Arctic waters. Canada already implements such a system on the East Coast 
called ECAREG without protest and the United States has taken a great 
interest in the ECAREG system57. Ship safety, not questions of legal 
jurisdiction, have promoted the use of vessel traffic reporting systems and 
vessel traffic management systems (VTMS). The 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention talks only in terms of coastal states having rights to establish, in 
consultation with the International Maritime Organization (IMO), passive 
vessel traffic separation systems (VTSS). The mandatory implementation of 
NORDREG was under review by the Canadian Parliament prior to the Polar 
Sea controversy and will likely be in place shortly. The realities of ship safety 
and proper management, particularly in a harsh environment like the Arctic 
where Canadians have the best information of ice conditions, weather and 
other important navigational aids, will leave the United States with little 
grounds for complaint, while at the same time improving Canada's legal 
position. 
A variety of indirect actions can be envisioned which would fall within 
Dr. Pharand's term of "technical sovereignty" and which would improve 
Canada's legal position by exercising jurisdiction. These largely involve 
better information on Arctic conditions and improvement of Canadian 
capabilities in the North 58. External Affairs Minister Clark indicated that 
actions of this type could be expected in the future. One possibility raised by 
Dr. Pharand would be to adopt the Soviet policy of issuing a brochure of 
charges to be levied on foreigners utilizing the services of the Soviet Union 
through the Northwest Passage. This would probably lead to a strong United 
States reaction since it would directly raise, not only the issue of the legal 
56. Supra, note 18, p. 191. 
57. E. G O L D , « Vessel Traffic Regulation : The Interface of Maritime Law Safety and 
Operational Freedom», (1983) 14 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 1-21. 
58. PHARAND, supra, note 12, p. 112-113. 
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status of the Northwest Passage, but the entire problem of user fees for 
navigational aids and assistance and transit fees, all of which have been 
resisted by the maritime states59. 
Conclusion 
An evaluation of the facts surrounding the legal issues favour long-term 
Canadian control of the Northwest Passage. The Passage is not a crucial 
international thoroughfare, it has limited strategic importance, it is used 
almost exclusively by Canadians, Canadian citizens have utilized the waters 
for centuries, it is geographically surrounded by Canada, Canada is the 
country with the unquestioned paramount interest, and Canada has taken 
measures to exercise legal jurisdiction. 
The drawing of straight baselines will enhance Canada's legal claim 
since it identifies the waters involved in Canada's claim and provides hard 
evidence of Canada's position. The removal of the reservation to the 
International Court indicated that the Canadian Government has faith in its 
jurisdictional claim. The building of the Class 8 icebreaker will improve 
Canada's presence in the Arctic, provide a means of enforcement and show 
an exercising of claimed jurisdiction. 
The actions by the Canadian Government taken in the wake of the 
Polar Sea will commence the process of bridging the factual presence of 
Canada in the Northwest Passage with the legal arguments necessary for the 
evolution of an unassailable Canadian claim that the waters of the Arctic are 
internal and foreign vessels cannot navigate within the waters without 
permission. 
The legal uncertainties about the status of the Northwest Passage may 
continue for years, but with a careful policy of increasing the already 
extensive Canadian presence in Arctic waters, the legal problems may well 
become moot. 
59. The question of user or transit fees has arisen respecting the Straits of Malacca, see : 
K.L. KOH, Straits in International Navigation: Contemporary Issues, New York, Oceana 
Publications, 1982, p. 61-62; M.J. VALENCIA and A.B. JAAFAR, « Environmental Manage-
ment of the Malacca/Singapore Straits : Legal and Institutional Issues», (1985) 25 Natural 
Resources Journal 695, p. 721, and generally on transit fees : R. MESZNIK, « Transit Fees for 
Ocean Straits and Their Impact on Global Economic Welfare », (1980) 8 Ocean Development 
and International Law Journal 337-354. 
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Figure One : Extent of Canada 's Offshore Jurisdiction in the Arctic. 
Source: H. M I L L S , "Ocean Policy Making in the Canadian Arctic", in Ocean Policy and Management in the Arctic, (1984), p. 13. 
